Segmentation and pricing behavior in a market for certification by Hvide, Hans K.
Segmentation and Pricing Behavior in a
Market for Certification∗
Hans K. Hvide†
November 26, 2002
Abstract
The paper oﬀers a simple theory of pricing behavior in certification markets. The
basis for the theory is that certifiers oﬀer diﬀerentiated tests; for an object of given
quality it may be more diﬃcult to pass the test of certifier i than the test of certifier
j. Given the test standards, certifiers compete for customers via their simultaneous
pricing decisions. In equilibrium, each certifier attracts a connected segment of the
market, and sellers of high quality products pay a higher price for certification than
sellers of low quality products. Lemons may be certified in equilibrium, although the
responsible certifier could have screened oﬀ the lemons by charging a higher price.
The theory is applied to the US market for MBA education and finds support.
Keywords: Adverse Selection, Auditing, Certification, Investment Banking, Oligopoly
theory, MBA, Signaling.
1 Introduction
To oﬀset negative eﬀects from asymmetries of information, diﬀerent institutions can
emerge. One example is warranties; if contracts can be written such that sellers of low-
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quality products are punished, such ’lemons’ will be pulled from the market, and a more
eﬃcient level of trade can be realized. A diﬀerent institution that can facilitate trade,
particularly when contracts are diﬃcult to write or to enforce, due to e.g., limited liabil-
ity, is certification. Certifiers are third parties in the trading process with some ability
to assess quality before trade takes place. Equipped with such assessment abilities, and
a reputation for truth-telling, certifiers can make a business by charging a fee for testing
objects and making their assessment known to potential buyers.
A common characteristic of certification markets is that diﬀerent certifiers serve dif-
ferent segments of the market. For example, it is well known from the auditing industry
that the ’Big 4’ auditors attract mainly high quality firms; the equity oﬀerings of highest
quality are underwritten by the ’Big 8’ investment banks; journals of higher rank gener-
ally publish papers of higher quality than lower rank journals, and top-ranked universities
admit entry and award degrees to students of higher average ability than universities of
lower rank.
The segmentation of sellers in certification markets implies that the value of a certifi-
cate can be highly dependent on which certifier issued it: A firm’s value will be higher if
KPMG finds its accounting practices in line with GAAP (Generally Accepted Account-
ing Principles) than if a regional auditing firm had formed the same conclusion, equity
oﬀerings by top investment banks are less underpriced than oﬀerings by less prestigious
investment banks, for an economist the value of a publication in Econometrica is higher
than the value of a publication in lower-ranked journals, a student’s job market prospects
are better if he receives an MBA degree from Harvard than from most other universities,
and, for marine vessels, a certificate from Lloyds or Veritas is a stronger indication of high
quality (e.g., low risk of making environmental damage) than a certificate from one of the
smaller agencies.1
The paper proposes a simple theory of certification that has segmentation as a feature
of equilibrium, and which moreover delivers testable hypotheses about the fees set by
1There is ample evidence that the value of certificates strongly depend upon the identity of the
certifier, controling for the observable characteristics of the sellers. For auditing, Krishnan (2002) surveys
the literature, for security and equity issues see e.g., Puri (1996), for the market for MBA education see
Tracy & Waldfogel (1997).
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diﬀerent certifiers in equilibrium.2 We can think of several possible explanations for
segmentation. One would be that the certifier (or certifiers) with most reputation capital
would give the most trustworthy reports, and therefore be the most attractive certifier
for the high quality sellers. However, this approach seems inadequate to explain why the
certifier with most reputation capital does not capture the whole market. In a similar vein,
segmentation could occur because the high-quality sellers prefer to attend the certifier (or
certifiers) with the most precise testing technology. However, in that case, it would be
unclear why the medium-quality sellers would not also prefer the most precise test, and so
on until only the lowest-quality sellers (if any) would attend a certifier with an imprecise
test. In contrast, the present theory of segmentation is based on the assertion that diﬀerent
certifiers have tests that cannot be ranked in terms of precision, but can be ranked in terms
of passing diﬃculty. For example, it demands more from a firm’s accounting practices
to have one of the Big 4 auditing firms to certify one’s accounting than a local auditing
firm, it is more diﬃcult to gain admittance to a Harvard MBA than to a lower-ranked
program, and it is more diﬃcult to have a paper accepted in Econometrica than in most
other journals.
The paper explores this intuition in a simple static model of an oligopolistic certifi-
cation market. In the model, there are sellers and certifiers, and a competitive product
market where the sellers’ objects are traded. There is a continuum of possible product
qualities, and initially only sellers know the quality of their product. Each certifier is
endowed with a test that enables it to (imperfectly) distinguish objects with quality lower
than a cutoﬀ value from objects with quality higher than the cutoﬀ value. Certifiers oﬀer
diﬀerentiated tests, in that it may be more diﬃcult to pass the test of certifier i than
the test of certifier j. Given the test structure, certifiers choose their testing fees simul-
taneously. Sellers then decide which certifier to attend (if any). Tests, which are binary,
2We are not aware of equilibrium theories of certification that are able to explain the segmentation in
certification markets. For example, Biglaiser & Friedman (2001) builds on Biglaiser (1993) to consider
a model with discrete product quality where symmetric certifiers compete for customers through their
pricing rule. There is no sense of segmentation in their setting. Puri (1999) obtains segmentation of low
and high quality security issues to diﬀerent underwriters (commercial and investment banks which act
as certifiers), but makes very restrictive assumptions about competition between underwriters; there is
only one bank of each type and moreover pricing decisions are exogenous. The same type of criticism
can be raised against the signaling model of Titman & Trueman (1986), which attempts to endogenize
the choice of auditor quality, where auditors have a pure certification role.
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are then performed, and the test results reported privately to sellers. Each seller then
decides whether to make the report public or not. Finally the market bids for an object
conditional on which certifier it attended (if any) and the report available about that
object. Notice that since the tests are imperfect, the possibility of lemons being certified
and traded cannot be excluded ex-ante. As we shall see, lemons can indeed be certified
in equilibrium even if the responsible certifier(s) could screen oﬀ lemons by charging a
higher price.
Denoting the number of active certifiers by n, equilibria are characterized by a price
charged by each certifier and a sorting of sellers into n + 1 groups, one group for each
certifier and one group that does not attend any certifier. Under a simple suﬃcient
condition on the test structures, each of these groups are connected in equilibrium, i.e.,
segmentation of sellers obtains as an equilibrium outcome. For example, in the case
of two active certifiers, sellers with the lowest quality skip certification, sellers with an
intermediate quality attend one certifier, and the high-quality sellers attend the other
certifier.
Turning to the prices charged for the certification test in equilibrium, it is shown that
they will be monotonic: a certifier attracting sellers of higher quality will charge a higher
price. While argued that the segmentation of sellers derived as a feature of equilibrium
is consistent with one of the stylized facts from certification markets, I wish to assess the
empirical validity of the price monotonicity result. To address that issue, a simple test is
performed with data from the market for MBA education. The test, which takes as an
article of faith that certification is indeed the most important function of MBA education
and not e.g., human capital acquisition,3 gives support to the pricing hypothesis.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
considers the monopoly certifier case, and Section 4 considers market structure under
oligopoly. Section 5 considers the pricing (tuition fee) decisions for a sample of MBA
programs in the US, and Section 6 concludes. Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3Diﬃculties in entangling information from human capital eﬀects is a well-known problem in the
empirical education literature, see e.g., the overview by Weiss (1995).
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2 The Model
There are sellers, certifiers, and a market for objects, all agents being risk-neutral. Each
seller is equipped with an object with value q to the market and value 0 to himself. The
value q is known to the seller, while the market merely knows that the distribution of
objects follows the frequency function h(q). I assume that h(q) is a constant on the
domain Q = [a, 1], and moreover that −∞ < a ≤ −1. Neither of these two assumptions
are necessary for the analysis but captures in a simple manner that there will be no trade
without certifiers present in the market.
There are finitely many (n) active certifiers in the certification market. This assump-
tion can be justified both by the limited number of certifiers in real certification markets
and by arguing for considerable fixed costs in acquiring expertise in testing products and
in acquiring reputation for producing honest reports. The formal analysis is limited to the
monopoly case (n = 1) and the duopoly (n = 2) case, but the duopoly results generalize
to an arbitrary n > 2.
Certifier i operates a test grid with K levels, {I1i , I
2
i , .., I
K
i }, where I
1
i < I
2
i < ... <
IKi ∈ <. The test identifies which interval qˆi lies on, where qˆi is a noisy measure of q.
Specifically, it is assumed that qˆi = q + εi, where εi is white noise with density function
fi(x). There are followingly K +1 possible test results, where the object obtains the test
result m if Imi < qˆi < I
m+1
i , where m ∈ {1, 2, ..,K + 1}. The analysis focuses on the
special case of binary tests (K = 1). Hence there are only two possible test results, where
an object obtains the test result 0 from certifier i if qˆi < Ii and obtains the test result
1 if qˆi > Ii. For convenience, I label the 0-result by ’fail’ and the 1-result by ’pass’.4
Although obviously a simplification, binary tests seem to be a good approximation to
what goes on in several certifying markets, such as the market for auditing reports, MBA
degrees, driving licenses, marine vessel certification, and industrial products certification.
(GAAP standard or not, admit or not, fail or pass, ISO standard or not).5 The test
4This shorthand is slightly misleading as objects that fail may well be traded later on. Hence certifiers
in the present model are not gatekeepers, as discussed by Choi (1996).
5Although credit rating agencies have an arsenal of possible grades, empirical studies show that the
real diﬀerence in grade is between investment bond grade (BB and higher) and junk bond (B and lower),
so one can argue that the model fits this situation pretty well, too. An interesting question is why reports
are typically so coarse. One reason may be that a too rich ’language’ gives too strong incentives for
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standards {Ii}i=1,..,n are taken as exogenously given. It should be mentioned, however,
that the results do not depend on any specific assumptions made on the location of the
test standards {Ii}i=1,..,n.
The timing is as follows. First, the certifiers compete in prices, taking the test stan-
dards as given. Certifier i’s price variable is labeled by Pi ∈ <+. Sellers then decide
simultaneously which certifier to attend (if any) after observing {Pi,Ii}i=1,..,n. If a seller
decides to attend certifier i, he pays the testing fee Pi to that certifier, and the test is
performed. The test result is then reported privately to sellers, and sellers individually
choose whether to hide the report or to make it public. Reports cannot be frauded, neither
by certifiers nor by sellers.6 The product market is assumed to be competitive, meaning
that a seller here gets a price for his product equal to its expected quality, conditional on
which certifier attended to (if any), and the test report.
Equilibrium is a situation where each seller chooses certifier (if any) optimally, condi-
tional on the pricing decision of the certifiers and his expectation of the behavior of other
sellers. Moreover, each certifier sets a fee that is optimal given the fees charged by the
other certifiers and the (expected) behavior of the sellers.
3 Monopoly
Let us begin by considering the case with only one active certifier in the market. I assume
(and show later) that equilibrium has a connected structure: sellers on the interval [a,q1]
do not to attend the certifier, and sellers on the interval [q1, 1] do attend the certifier,
where the seller with quality q1 is indiﬀerent between attending the certifier or not.
Assuming that test results will be made public by sellers, the expected utility for an
agent with quality q for attending a certifier with test standard I and price P , taking the
cutoﬀ q1 as given, equals the expected market posterior of quality after the test has been
certifiers to misreport.
6Potentially, sellers and certifiers could have incentives to collude in frauding reports, as might occured
in the Anderson-Enron case. The present model does not consider that very interesting issue.
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made public, subtracted the cost of certification,
U(q; q1) = Pr(pass|q, I)U(pass) + Pr(fail|q, I)U(fail)− P (1)
where,
Pr(pass|q, I) =
Z
I−q
f(x)dx (2)
Pr(fail|q, I) = 1− Pr(pass|q, I)
U(fail) and U(pass) denote the expected quality (and hence price obtained) for an object
that passes and fails the test, respectively, given that all reports are made public in the
market. Since there is a continuum of sellers, each seller takes U(fail) and U(pass)
as constants (these constants are derived in the Appendix). The probability of passing
the test increases in q, and therefore U(pass) > U(fail). It follows that U 0(q; .) > 0,
∀q ∈ [q1, 1] since Pr(pass|q, I) increases in q from (2).
It will be useful to define the (expected) gross utility for attending the certifier, UU(q, .)
as,
Definition 3.1 UU(q; q1) = Pr(pass|q, I)U(pass) + Pr(fail|q, I)U(fail)
The UU(q; .) function gives the expected market posterior after the test result is
revealed for an object with true value equal to q. Let us collect two useful properties of
the UU(q; .) function.
Remark 1 i)q1 < UU(q; q1) < 1, q ∈ [q1, 1], and ii)
1
2
<
∂UU(q1; q1)
∂q1
< 1.
Proof. i) follows directly from the test being imperfect and Bayesian updating by
the market. To see that ii) holds, observe that a perfectly non-informative test has
∂UU(q1; q1)
∂q1
=
∂
∂q1
(
q1 + 1
2
) =
1
2
, and a perfectly informative test has
∂UU(q1; q1)
∂q
= 1,
with imperfectly informative tests lying in between.
The cutoﬀ q1 is determined by the marginal seller, i.e., the seller that is indiﬀerent
between attending the certifier and not. Since the utility for sellers that do not attend a
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certifier must be zero (no trade),7 q1 can be defined implicitly through the equation,
Ψ(P, q1) = UU(q1; q1)− P = 0 (3)
Since Ψ(P, q1) decreases strictly in P and increases strictly in q1 from Remark 1, equation
(3) defines q1 implicitly as an increasing function of P . By the implicit function theorem,
dq1
dP
can be determined as,
dq1
dP
= −ΨPΨq1
=
1
Ψq1
(4)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. This expression is greater than zero by Re-
mark 1, since 1Ψq1 = [
∂UU(q1;q1)
∂q1 ]
−1 > 0.
Let us now consider the monopolists profit maximization problem. Assuming zero fixed
and variable costs of certification for convenience, and normalizing by setting f(q) = 1,
the monopoly profits are,
Π = P (1− q1) (5)
The optimal P solves the first order condition,
dΠ
dP
= 1− q − dq1
dP
P = 0 (6)
Since
dq1
dP
> 0 from equation (4), equation (6) shows that the basic trade-oﬀ facing a
certifier in the pricing decision is that a higher price brings a positive direct eﬀect on
profits but a negative indirect eﬀect through a higher q1.
Denoting the equilibrium value of q1 by q∗1, the following can be noted.
Remark 2 Monopoly equilibrium. i)The monopolist sets a price for certification such
that q∗1 > 0. Hence no lemons will be certified in equilibrium, but some non-lemons, i.e.,
with q ∈ [0,q∗1], will not be certified. ii)The sellers will make the report public independent
of the test result.
7This holds because we assumed that a ≤ −1. With a > −1 then the utility for not being certified
can be greater than zero, since these objects may also be traded. Say for illustration that a = 0. Then
the utility of not being certified equals
q1
2
(average quality of sellers that do not attend the certifier).
Apart from that, the equilibrium will have the same qualitative features.
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Proof. i)Clearly q∗1 must be on the interior of Q and hence it is suﬃcient to show
that
dΠ
dP
> 0 for q1 ≤ 0. For q1 to equal zero, we can see from (3) that P = UU(0, 0).
Inserting into the expression for
dΠ
dP
in (4), we get,
dΠ
dP q1=0
= 1− UU(0, 0)Ψq1(0)
(7)
By Remark 1,
1
2
<
∂UU(q1; .)
∂q1
< 1 for any q1. Hence
1
Ψq1(0)
= [
∂UU(q1; .)
∂q1
]−1q1=0 > 1.
But, since UU(0, 0) < 1 by Remark 1, we must have that
UU(0, 0)
Ψq1(0)
< 1. It follows that
dΠ
dP q1=0
> 0. By the same argument, it follows that
dΠ
dP q1<0
> 0. Hence
dΠ
dP
> 0 for q1 ≤ 0,
and q∗1 > 0 follows. ii)After the sellers have received their reports, they are divided into
three categories. Those with a pass report, those with a fail report, and those without a
report. Clearly those with a pass report will have an incentive to make it public, since
they have the highest quality. But conditional on the pass reports being made public,
the sellers with fail reports will also make their reports public, since they have a higher
quality than those that do not have a report.
The intuition for part i) can be understood in terms of standard monopoly theory.
While the socially optimal cutoﬀ is q1 = 0, in which case no lemons (q < 0) will be traded
and all non-lemons (q > 0) will be traded, monopoly maximizes profits by choosing a price
that results in too low trade volume (q∗1 > 0), because it maximizes own revenue rather
than social surplus.8 The second part follows from a standard unraveling argument.
To illustrate the solution of the monopolist pricing problem, let us consider an exam-
ple.9
Example 1 Let ε be normally distributed with mean zero and variance .1. h(q) = 1 for
q ∈ Q = [−1, 1]. Then for I = 0, the equilibrium is (P ∗, q∗1) = (.40, .06) with associated
profits equal to .38. The average pass rate equals .76 .
Let me make two comments on the equilibrium structure. First, the reason for why
8Having positive marginal costs of certification would not alter this insight, and would result in an
even higher q∗1 . However, for h(q) functions with a high h(0), the result may not hold.
9The calculations for all the examples are performed in Maple V, and are available from the author.
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the upper cutoﬀ must equal 1 is that if the sellers on the top had incentives to deviate,
then this must also be true for the sellers immediately below and unraveling would follow.
So in any equilibrium with certification it must be true that the sellers attending the
certifier is a connected set [q∗1, 1].
10 To gain intuition for why q∗1 is unique, notice that for
a given choice of P , the derived q1 is the only one consistent with equilibrium, by equation
(3). For example, for P = .40 in Example 1 then q1 = 0 would imply that Ψ is negative
and the persons with a low but positive q would get a negative utility from attending
the certifier, and hence would have incentives to deviate. In this sense there must be
unraveling from the bottom in equilibrium. For a candidate q∗1 higher than the solved for,
Ψ is positive, and there will be sellers that can obtain a higher utility by attending the
certifier rather than not attending the certifier.11
4 Duopoly
Let us now consider equilibria in a market with n active certifiers, where n is taken to
equal 2 for expositional clarity. Noting that equal test standards I1 = I2 would imply
Bertrand competition between the certifiers and P1 = P2 = 0, we consider the case with
unequal test standards I1 6= I2, and apply the convention I1 < I2.
Assuming again that test results are made public, the expected utility from attending
certifier i for an agent with quality q, denoted by Ui(q; .), equals,
Ui(q; .) = Pr(passi|q, Ii)Ui(pass) + Pr(faili|q, Ii)Ui(fail)− Pi (8)
where Ui(pass) is the average quality of the objects that pass test i, Ui(fail) is the average
10Imposing the intuitive criterion will eliminate the equilibrium where no agents attend the certifier
because it fears that the market will ignore the information lying in the test result.
11Setting σ2 = 130 instead of σ =
1
10 in Example 1 gives (P
∗, q1) = (.45, .16) with associated profits
equal to .40. This result mirrors the finding from Lizzeri (1999), Theorem 1, where the monopolist
certifier chooses an uninformative test in optimum. The intuition for the result in our setting is that
when σ gets higher, setting a higher price will result only in a small change in q1, since U 0(q; .) is close
to zero, and hence the monopolist will charge a price close to 1/2 as σ tends to infinity, and take all the
surplus in the market. Even if having a very imprecise test can be profitable in the monopoly case, in
the oligopoly case such a test would make it too easy for the other certifiers (who has more informative
tests) to steal sellers, and would not be optimal.
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quality of the objects that fail test i, and
Pr(passi|q, Ii) =
Z
Ii−q
fi(x)dx = 1− Pr(faili|q, Ii)
In an equilibrium where both certifiers attract a positive measure of sellers, there must
exist at least one value of q such that U1(q; .) = U2(q; .). Define Φ(q; .) = U1(q; .)−U2(q; .),
and then define the set Q2 as,
Q2 = {q : Φ(q; .)} = 0 (10)
The set Q2 contains the points of indiﬀerence between attending certifier 1 and certifier
2. I denote by q˜ an arbitrary element in Q2, and consider equilibria with the following
structure: for at least one q˜ sellers with a q immediately below q˜ prefer to attend certifier
1, and sellers with a q immediately above q˜ prefer to attend certifier 2. This property is
denoted by the ’crossing property’.
Definition 4.1 The crossing property (CP) holds if there exists q ∈ Q2 such that i)Φ(q−
²) > 0, and ii)Φ(q + ²) < 0, for ² suﬃciently close to zero.
It will be shown that the local condition CP implies connectedness of equilibria, given
that a suﬃcient condition on the test technologies hold. First a definition.
Definition 4.2 Single crossing property (SCP) holds if for any q ∈ Q2 and ² > 0, then
Φ(q − ²) > 0 and Φ(q + ²) < 0.
If the global condition SCP holds, then there exists only one value of q that makes
sellers indiﬀerent between attending the two certifiers, and connectedness follows.
Assumption 1.
The likelihood ratio f1(I1 − q)/f2(I2 − q) decreases in q, for all q ∈ Q.
A decreasing likelihood ratio (DRLP) implies that the higher q, the higher is the
relative probability of passing the diﬃcult test (compared to the easy test).12 This is a
12Similar conditions to the decreasing likelihood ratio function are often assumed to hold in the moral
hazard literature (see e.g., Holmstrom 1979), but we are not aware of such conditions being applied in
the adverse selection literature.
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natural requirement that is satisfied for a range of joint distributions. For example, let ε1
and ε2 be iid normally distributed with variance σ2, to obtain,
f1(I1 − q; .)/f2(I2 − q; .) =
1
σ
√
2π
e−(I1−q)
2/2σ2/
1
σ
√
2π
e−(I2−q)
2/2σ2 (11)
= e
−
(I2 − I1)(I2 − 2q + I1)
2σ2
This expression decreases in q if I2 − I1 > 0, or in other words if I1 < I2 , and hence
DLRP is satisfied.
We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 CP implies connectedness.
Proof. Suppose that CP holds in the point q˜, i.e., q˜ ∈ Q2 and
∂Φ(q)
∂q q=q˜
< 0. Recall
that Ui(q; .) = Pr(passi|q, Ii)Ui(pass) + [1 − Pr(passi|q, Ii)]Ui(fail) − Pi, and observe
that only the Pr(passi|q, Ii) terms in this expression depend on q. Further observe that
∂ Pr(passi|q, Ii)
∂q
= fi(Ii − q), and define ∆i = Ui(pass)− Ui(fail). We then have,
∂Φ(q; .)
∂q
= U1’(q; .)− U2’(q; .) (12)
= f1(I1 − q)∆1 − f2(I2 − q)∆2
For an arbitrary value of q, this expression is negative if,
θ =
f1(I1 − q)∆1
f1(I2 − q)∆2
< 1 (13)
Since
∆1
∆2
is a constant, it is suﬃcient for SCP to hold that the likelihood ratio f1(I1 −
q)/f2(I2 − q) decreases in q for q > q˜, which is ensured by Assumption 1. Hence CP
implies SCP and connectedness.
Assumption 1 ensures that if a seller with a given quality prefers test 2 to test 1 then
a seller with a higher quality also prefers test 2 to test 1. It follows that equilibria must
be connected, and a unique divide is obtained between the sellers that prefer to attend
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certifier 1 and to attend certifier 2, respectively. This result is obtained without making
any assumptions about pricing behavior.
In an equilibrium where both certifiers are active, there must also exist a seller that is
indiﬀerent between attending certifier 1 and not attending a certifier. This cutoﬀ value,
denoted by q1, can be defined implicitly through the equation,
UU1(q1, .)− P1 = 0 (14)
As can be seen by the same type of argument as in the monopoly case, q1 is uniquely
determined for given values of (P1, q2). Let us denote by q∗1 the equilibrium value of q1.
Then the following holds.
Lemma 2 i)In an equilibrium with two active certifiers, CP implies that q∗1 < q∗2. ii)q∗1 >
a.
Proof. i) follows from straightforward manipulations, and is skipped. To prove ii),
observe that q∗1 = a would imply that the average quality of those that attend certifier
1 being negative, since a ≤ −1 and certifier 2 attracts the upper end of the market by
Lemma 1. But in that case certifier 1 must charge a negative price, which is clearly not
consistent with equilibrium.
Note that part ii) means that sellers on [a, q∗1] do not attend a certifier in equilibrium.
We now have the following.
Proposition 1 Segmentation. In an equilibrium with two active certifiers, CP implies
that sellers can be split into three connected segments. In increasing order of quality, the
segments are: those that do not attend a certifier, those that attend certifier 1, and those
that attend certifier 2.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
This is a key result, since it shows that the model produces equilibria where diﬀerent
certifiers capture diﬀerent connected segments of the market, as the motivation for the
paper called for.
After the testing, sellers will be separated into five groups: those that did not attend
a certifier, those that attended certifier 1 and failed, those that attended certifier 1 and
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passed, those that attended certifier 2 and failed, and finally those that attended certifier
2 and passed. These groups are of strictly increasing quality, and will therefore be traded
at strictly increasing prices in the market (the reports will be revealed due to unraveling).
An implication is that sellers that attend certifier 2 must (on average) be traded at a
higher price than the sellers that attend certifier 1, consistent with one of the stylized
facts posited in the Introduction.13
Consequently, we can rank certifiers in equilibrium according to the magnitude of the
value increase due to attending that certifier: certifier 1 provides a lower value increase for
sellers than certifier 2. A natural question is whether this ranking has any implications
for the fees set by the certifiers. Will the top ranked certifier always charge a higher
price than a lower ranked certifier? It turns out that the answer to this question is in the
aﬃrmative.
Proposition 2 Pricing behavior. CP implies that P ∗2 > P ∗1 in equilibrium.
Proof. Recall that the UUi(q; .) functions give the expected market conception ex-
post for an agent with ability q that attends certifier i. Since CP implies connectedness,
by Remark 1, part i), it must be the case that UU1(q; .) < UU2(q; .). In particular,
for agent q∗2, which is indiﬀerent between which certifier to attend, it must be the case
that UU1(q∗2; .) < UU2(q
∗
2; .). But the indiﬀerence condition says that UU1(q
∗
2; .) − P ∗1 =
UU2(q
∗
2; .) − P ∗2 . Combining these two expressions immediately yields that UU1(q∗2; .) −
UU2(q
∗
2; .) = P
∗
1 − P ∗2 < 0, and hence P ∗2 > P ∗1 follows.
The proposition says that prices will be monotonic in the equilibrium rank of certifiers:
the certifier who attracts the sellers of highest quality will charge a higher price. The
intuition for the result is that a seller knows that if he takes the simple test, the market
will believe that his object is of lower quality than if he takes the diﬃcult test (observe
that this holds independently of the test outcome). Given this drawback of attending
13The increase in market value for a seller from attending a certifier depends on which certifier he
attended and on whether he passes the test or not. The relative magnitude of these two eﬀects will
depend on the informativeness of the tests: if the tests are relatively uninformative (high variance of the
σi’s) then the diﬀerence in market value for attending diﬀerent certifiers (and, say, passing) will be much
larger than the diﬀerence in market value from passing or failing a given test. On the other hand, if the
tests are relatively informative, then the diﬀerence in market value from passing or failing a given test
can be almost as large as the diﬀerence in market value for passing diﬀerent tests.
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certifier 1, the price for attending certifier 1 must be lower than the price for attending
certifier 2 for an indiﬀerent seller to exist.
This result is very useful in that it gives a concrete testable hypothesis from the model.
In the next section I discuss how one can test this hypothesis, and perform a simple test
with data from the market for MBA education.14
Let us now consider a numerical example, to illustrate the equilibrium structure.
Example 2 Let εi be normally and independently distributed with mean zero and variance
.35. h(q) = 1 for q ∈ Q = [−1, 1] . Then for I1 = 0 and I2 = .35 we get (P ∗1 , P ∗2 , q∗1, q∗2) =
(.09, .43,−.03, .25) with associated profits, Π∗1(.) ≈ .04, Π∗2(.) ≈ .32. The average pass rate
is .75 for test 1, and .83 for test 2.
The equilibrium can be illustrated with a figure.
-1 1-.03 .25
Not certified Certifier 2Certifier 1
q
Equilibrium separation
The sellers between -1 and -.03 do not attend a certifier, the sellers between -.03 and
.25 attend certifier 1, and the sellers between .25 and 1 attend certifier 2. After the
test results have been made public, the market will hold the following belief about the
14Let us here make two comments on the uniqueness properties of the model.
First, the crossing property may seem like an obvious property of equilibrium, but in fact there can
exist equilibria with the reverse structure of that considered, namely that the middle group of sellers
attends the certifier with the highest Ii and the upper group of sellers attends the certifier with the
lowest Ii. By the same type of argument as in Lemma 1, it can be shown that such equilibria will also
be connected, and hence that the equivalent of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 will also hold.
Second, SCP does not exclude the possibility of a multiplicity of equilibria. The reason for possible
multiplicity is that the Φ(.) function has q1 as a free variable, and hence it is possible that more than
one value of q1 (and hence q2) is consistent with equilibrium. Therefore our main results, Proposition 1
and Proposition 2, apply to every equilibrium in the equilibrium set, and does not hinge on uniqueness
of equilibria.
The underlying reason for the potential multiplicity of equilibria is the social interaction aspect of
the model: which test a seller wishes to attend depends on the behavior of other sellers, because their
behavior determines Ui(pass) and Ui(fail). This aspect of the model is in contrast to related models of
product diﬀerentation, see footnote 18.
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(average) quality of the five groups: (-.48,.07,.13,.38,.68), and hence only objects that did
not attend a certifier will not be traded in equilibrium.15
Since objects between -.03 and 0 attend a certifier and are traded in equilibrium, the
example shows that lemons may be certified in equilibrium. Let us state that as a remark.
Remark 3 In a duopoly, lemons may be certified.
Let us explain the intuition for this result in some detail. The bottom certifier attracts
the group [q∗1, q
∗
2]. If q2 were independent of P1 then q
∗
1 > 0, by the same argument
as in the monopoly case. However, since q2 depends on P1, then decreasing P1 to the
point where q∗1 < 0 may be profitable for certifier 1, if q2 increases in P1. In a diﬀerent
phrasing, certifier 1 does not internalize the negative externality imposed on certifier 2
from decreasing the price. Although the eﬀect of having q∗1 below 0 in isolation decreases
the certifier 1 profits, the positive eﬀect on profits from increasing q∗2 outweighs this eﬀect,
and we get an ineﬃcient equilibrium where some lemons are certified. The result seems
to be quite general, in that I have been unable to generate examples with q∗1 > 0.
To sum up, I have shown that the model produces equilibria where diﬀerent certifiers
attract diﬀerent, connected, seller segments. Moreover, a certifier attracting a segment
with a higher quality will charge a higher price than a certifier attracting a lower quality
segment in equilibrium. Let me now discuss some points on robustness of the results
obtained.
The introduction of costs of testing for the certifier would have no eﬀect on the basic
segmentation and price monotonicity result, as can readily be seen from the proofs of
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1; such costs would not aﬀect the proofs. Similarly, from the
same type of argument as in Lemma 1, DLRP is suﬃcient to get connected equilibria also
in a setting where there are arbitrary many active certifiers. Hence the price monotonicity
result would hold also hold in such a generalized oligopoly setting.16
15The example suggests that the profits for the upper certifier is higher than the profits for the bottom
certifier. We have been unable to generate counterexamples to this assertion, but have also been unable
to prove it.
16The generalized Assumption 1 would be that fi(Ii − q)/fj(Ij − q) decreases in q for all i, j such that
Ii < Ij .
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We have considered a one-shot game where sellers can attend only one certifier. In
some certification markets sellers can attend several subsequent certifiers, which could give
sellers incentives to hide negative reports. For example, in the market for MBA degrees
and in the market for publication of scientific papers, acts of burning rejection slips are
not directly observable. However, such hiding can be indirectly observable; being enrolled
in a low-ranked MBA program is a pretty strong signal that (at least some) higher-ranked
programs declined entry (the case with scientific papers is analogous). In other markets,
such as auditing, to hide reports is simply illegal. Examples of certification markets where
the possibility of hiding negative reports makes an important diﬀerence seems to be quite
limited.17
Moreover, one can imagine an extended analysis taking the test standards as endoge-
nous, in the spirit of the product diﬀerentiation literature,18 or for each certifier to be
endowed with more than one test standard (K > 1). For anything but extreme cost
structures, there will be incentives for certifiers to diﬀerentiate their tests, to create mar-
ket power, and it is conjectured that segmentation would occur also in such generalized
settings. To illustrate that idea, let us consider an example of a setting where K = 1, but
where the test standards are chosen endogenously. To make the example computationally
tractable, I focus on the Stackelberg game where the leader chooses I2, and the follower
chooses an I1 after observing the choice of I2, where Ii ∈ {−1,−34 ,−12 , 0, 12 , 34 , 1}.19 The
cost of choosing Ii is assumed to be uniformly zero on this set. After observing the choices
of {Ii}i=1,2, the certifiers choose {Pi}i=1,2 simultaneously.
17The market for money-lending by commercial banks could be one such market. Broecker (1990)
constructs a model where the possibility of borrowers hiding negative ’reports’ (declined applications for
loan) can have an impact on equilibrium interest rates. In Broecker’s theory banks have identical credit
test technology and hence that theory cannot explain segmentation.
18In product diﬀerentiation models, firms first decide on product characteristics and then compete for
customers through their pricing decision. In models of vertical product diﬀerentiation (e.g., Shaked &
Sutton, 1982), firms oﬀer products of diﬀerent quality, and sellers diﬀer in their willingness to pay for
quality. In models of horizontal product diﬀerentiation (e.g., Salop 1979), customers have diﬀerent tastes
over products of the same quality. There are several diﬀerences between the present model and those
models in the product diﬀerentiation literature, perhaps the most important being that here, the test
product that an agent (seller) wishes to purchase depends not only on properties of the test itself, but
also on behavior of the other agents, as discussed in footnote 14.
19The case where the two certifiers choose Ii simultaneously would involve (symmetric) equilibria in
mixed strategies in the choice of Ii, and are computationally very complex, but should lead to the same
type of results.
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Example 3 Let εi be normally and independently distributed with mean zero and variance
.40. h(q) = 1 for q ∈ Q = [−1, 1]. We then get (I∗1 , I∗2 , P ∗1 , P ∗2 , q∗1, q∗2) ≈ (−34 , 1, .08, .53,−.06, .21)
with associated profits, Π∗1(.) ≈ .02, Π∗2(.) ≈ .41.
The profits of the upper certifier are much higher than the profit for the lower certifier,
which creates incentives for the first entering certifier to choose a tough standard (I∗2 = 1).
The second entering certifier avoids stiﬀ competition by choosing a soft standard I∗1 , in
safe distance from the choice of I∗2 .
20 Interestingly, this simple example captures some of
the dynamics of the market for business school degrees, where the oldest business schools
have the most demanding standards, attract the most able students, charge the most
presumptuous fees, and presumably makes the highest profits.21
5 Example: The Market for MBA Programs
In this section I wish to corrobate the insights of the model by testing the price monotonic-
ity result in the market for MBA degrees. The market for MBA education is chosen as an
application of the model for two reasons. The first reason is that certification presumably
plays an important role in this market. The second reason is that relevant data, e.g., on
pre-MBA and post-MBA salaries, and the costs of tuition, is easily available.22
Certification can take diﬀerent forms in the MBA market. The most obvious examples
are that MBA institutions certify students through their admittance decisions and through
the grading of individual students. A third possible certification eﬀect from participating
in an MBA program is that of establishing a network: getting a ’pass’ can then be
20There are conditions under which the first entering certifier could enter at the bottom, for example
costs for setting Ii that are increasing in the location Ii.
21Price data are more covert in other certification markets, but similar comments can probably be
made about several of them, such as the market for auditing reports and the market for underwriting
services.
22The present paper is to our knowledge the first one with an empirical analysis of certification based
on an equilibrium model, and furthermore the first that takes into account both the market value increase
and the cost of being certified. For example, Megginson & Weiss (1991) tests whether venture capitalists
fill a certification role when backing IPOs, and Puri (1996) investigates the certification role of investment
banks and commercial banks when underwriting security issues (before the Glass-Steagall Act), where
both papers consider only the market value increase from attending a certifierm, presumably due to data
limitations.
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interpreted as being accepted into an important student group, rather than as a high
grade. In sum, there are several sources of certification eﬀects in MBA programs.23
Let me now describe the data, discuss the test strategy, and then describe the empirical
results. The primary data source is the Financial Times 2001 ranking of MBA programs
worldwide based on the 1998 class (FT 2001). FT 2001 includes information on (average)
student characteristics at each program, such as salaries before and 3 years after the MBA,
percentage of international students, alumni networks, etc. FT 2001 also includes data
on program characteristics such as faculty research output, and faculty Ph.D. ratio, sex
ratio, etc. In addition to the FT ranking I use the Oﬃcial MBA Guide for information on
GMAT scores and costs of tuition for the programs. I confine the analysis to the two-year
US programs in the FT 2001 that provides tuition fees and (average) GMAT scores in the
Oﬃcial MBA guide, which gives a sample size of 48 programs.24
Suppose that we rank certifiers according to how much they (on average) add to the
market value of the objects that are certified. Then the main empirical implication of the
model is that certifiers with higher rank charging a higher price (i.e., tuition costs).25 If
MBA students were observationally equivalent in the market ex-ante, their salaries would
be the same before the MBA, and I could rank programs according to the post-MBA
salaries they generate. In that case, the pricing hypothesis could be tested simply by
evaluating the correlation between post-MBA salaries and the costs of tuition.
However, diﬀerent programs attract students with diﬀerent observable characteristics
(in contrast to in the model), and therefore post-MBA salaries is not a proper measure
of program rank. To control for ex-ante observable student heterogeneity when testing
23Consequently, there are several interpretations of the test standard of a certifier being lower than
the test standard of a diﬀerent certifier; i)it is easier to be admitted into a lower ranked MBA program,
ii)it is easier to obtain good grades in a lower ranked program, and finally iii)it is easier to be a member
of an important peer group in a lower ranked program. Since there are only small fees associated with
applying for a program, ii) and iii) more easily fits with a literal interpretation of the model than i) does.
24100 programs are ranked in FT 2001. All salary figures are indexed to the 2000 level. Since the cost
of tuition is relatively stable over time, we have used the easily available cost of tuition for year 2000
figures, rather than indexing the 1995 figures. The average salary across programs before the program
starts equals $63.008, the average salary after the end of a two-year program equals $107.104, the average
tuition cost equals $40.417 (per year), and the average GMAT score equals 653.
25The opportunity cost of time spent on the program is a very important component of the total costs
of attending an MBA program. These costs are hard to estimate in a precise manner, and are not included
in the analysis. Notice, however, that not including such costs makes the pricing hypothesis less obvious,
since higher-ranked programs have on average students with higher opportunity costs.
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the pricing hypothesis, I therefore regress post-MBA salary on the cost of tuition, con-
trolling for pre-MBA wage and GMAT diﬀerences.26 A positive and significant estimated
coeﬃcient on the relation between post-MBA salary and cost of tuition is interpreted as
a confirmation of the pricing hypothesis.
Ideally, I should have decomposed the eﬀect of attending an MBA program into two
parts, the value added stemming from increases in human capital, and the value added
that stems from identification of ability. Given the data limitations, such a decomposition
cannot be performed, and I will therefore assume that the increases in value due to human
capital acquisition are either negligible or roughly constant across programs (in the latter
case human capital acquisition would only have an impact upon the intercepts of the
regressions).
The following estimates were obtained (standard deviations in parentheses).27
26Although GMAT score is probably less observable than salary in the market ex-ante, including GMAT
is a simple way of correcting bias due to omitted observable variables such as occupational level (aﬀecting
e.g., expected career path) and geographical variations in employment (aﬀecting take home value of
salary).
27We include GMAT2 as a right hand side variable to accommodate non-linearities. The regressions
were performed in MINITAB. The data files and regression procedures are available from the author.
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Table 1 Relation between post-MBA wage and tuition cost
MBA 2001 MBA 2000
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Intercept 1079581 48964 -76227 55284
(1235704) (12659) (1354858) (14036)
Salary before 0,593 ... 0,489 ...
(0,388) (0,361)
GMAT -3623 ... -115 ...
(3762) (4116)
GMAT2 310 ... 0,47 ...
(287) (3,137)
Tuition cost 0,809 1,44 0,667 1,29
(0,273) (0,303) (0,278) (0,329)
# of observations 48 48 41 41
R2 64% 33% 62% 28%
Considering first column (II), there is a strong positive raw correlation between post-
MBA wage and tuition cost (TC). Since a higher cost of tuition may reflect both higher
unobservable and observable student characteristics, column (I) controls for observable
diﬀerences in student quality by including pre-MBA wage and GMAT scores on the right
hand side in the regression. The relation between post-MBA wage and TC is now weaker,
as expected, but is still positive and highly significant.28 Notice also that the R2 of
regression (I) is significantly higher than in regression (II). The regression indicates that
a 1$ increase in yearly tuition cost leads to a $0.81 expected increase in salary after the
program ends. For example, a $5.000 increase in tuition cost increases the expected salary
after the program by $4.500. To check the robustness of this finding, I performed the same
regressions on the FT 2000 data and obtained very similar results, see (III) and (IV).29
28For FT 2001, the t-value for the coeﬃcient on tuition cost is 2,97, with corresponding p-value equal
to 0,005.
29The similar findings can partly be explained by the same cost and GMAT data being used for the
two years, and we therefore performed an alternative test. In this alternative test, we first generated a
rank of schools by using the procedure of Tracy & Waldfogel (1997). This procedure regresses post-MBA
wage on student characteristics, and ranks schools according to the magnitude of the residuals from this
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Hence the support of the price monotonicity hypothesis is rather strong in the data.
6 Conclusion
The paper has proposed a simple theory of pricing behavior in an oligopolistic market for
certification. The usefulness of the theory is twofold. First, it clarifies the relation be-
tween signaling and certification. In signaling models, separation between diﬀerent types
is created through an exogenously imposed cost for taking certain actions, as in Spence
(1974).30 In contrast, I obtain a signaling type of equilibrium where the costs for diﬀerent
actions (which certifier to attend) is made endogenous through the certifiers’ pricing deci-
sions. Hence one can view the present approach as providing a possible microfoundation
for models of signaling.31 Second, at a more practical level, it was shown that equilibria
of the model accommodates several stylized facts from certification markets, the most
important being that diﬀerent certifiers capture diﬀerent segments of the market in equi-
librium. In addition, I derived the testable implication that the price for being certified
should increase in the rank of a certifier. The validity of this prediction was tested using
the US MBA market as an example, and received empirical support. However, the data
is too aggregated to make very definitive conclusions; future studies attempting to e.g.,
disentangle information from human capital acquisition eﬀects in the MBA market would
clearly be of interest.
Another possible extension would be to consider a model where certifiers fill addi-
tional roles to certification. For example, auditing firms are divided into an accounting
(certification) part and a consulting part, where the latter part oﬀers advice based on
the insights generated by the first part. It would be of interest to investigate what the
regression. To test the pricing hypothesis, we then regressed the residuals on TC, and obtained the same
type of results here as those expressed in Table 1 (the induced ranking for the FT 2001 data became:
1. Columbia, 2. Wharton, 3. Chicago, 4. Harvard, 5. Cornell, 6. Emory, 7. Georgetown, 8. Duke, 9.
Vanderbilt, and 10. Southern Methodist).
30There are numerous other examples of such models, two of the more relevant to the present context
being Puri’s (1999) signaling model of investment banking and Titman & Trueman’s (1986) signaling
model of auditing. Both models have exogenous prices.
31In addition to the examples of the previous footnote, Weiss (1983) creates separation into diﬀerent
lengths of education through a diﬀerential probability of passing a test for diﬀerent types. In the model
of Weiss (1983), however, there is only one school in the market, with an exogenous test standard and
tuition fee, while our tuition fee is endogenous.
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implications of this dual role can have for price setting and information revelation by au-
ditors. In which way would the dual role aﬀect the price competition for auditing services,
and how would it aﬀect certifiers’ incentives to reveal bad information? In light of recent
corporate scandals such as the weak reporting by Arthur Andersen in the Enron case,
these questions seem worthwhile to pursue.
7 Appendix
First U(pass) andU(fail) are derived. Recall that in general we haveE(q|A) =
R
A
gA(q)qdq
Pr ob(A)
where gA(.) is the conditional density function and A is some event. By the law of large
numbers, the fraction of sellers in the point q that passes the test is deterministic and
equals Pr(pass|q, I). The conditional density, i.e., the density of those that pass, is just
equal to this entity, and the probability of passing test I for a random seller on [q1, q2]
equals
R q2
q1
Pr(pass|q, I)dq. Hence we have that,
U(pass) =
R q2
q1
Pr(pass|q, I)qdqR q2
q1
Pr(pass|q, I)dq (A1)
U(fail) =
R q2
q1
Pr(fail|q, I)qdqR q2
q1
Pr(fail|q, I)dq
For an agent with ability q who attends a certifier whose customers lie on the interval
[q1, q2] we can therefore write,
U(q; q1, q2) = Pr(pass|q, I)
R q2
q1
Pr(pass|q, I)qdqR q2
q1
Pr(pass|q, I)dq +Pr(fail|q, I)
R q2
q1
Pr(fail|q, I)qdqR q2
q1
Pr(fail|q, I)dq − P
(A2)
Let us now consider the pricing game in a duopoly. The profits are,
Π1 = P1(q2 − q1) (A3)
Π2 = P2(1− q2)
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For the lower cutoﬀ q1 we have the same condition as in the monopoly case,
Ψ1(P1, P2, q1, q2) = UU1(q1; q1, q2)− P1 = 0 (A4)
For the upper cutoﬀ q2 we have the condition,
Ψ2(P1, P2, q1, q2) = UU2(q2; q2)− P2 − UU1(q2; q1, q2) + P1 = 0 (A5)
The first order conditions for profit maximization are,
dΠ1
dP1
= q2 − q1 + (
∂q2
∂P1
− ∂q1
∂P1
)P1 = 0 (A6)
dΠ2
dP2
= 1− q2 −
∂q2
∂P2
P2 = 0
I use the implicit function theorem to determine
∂q1
∂P1
as,
∂q1
∂P1
= −Ψ1P1Ψ1q1
=
1
Ψ1q1
(A7)
and,
∂q2
∂P1
= −Ψ2P1Ψ2q2
= − 1Ψ2q2
(A8)
∂q2
∂P2
= −Ψ2P2Ψ2q2
=
1
Ψ2q2
We then have the following four equations determining the four endogenous variables
(P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , q
∗
1, q
∗
2),
dΠ1
dP1
= q2 − q1 − P1[
1
Ψ2q1
+
1
Ψ1q2
] = 0 (A9)
dΠ2
dP2
= 1− q1 +
P2
Ψ2q2
= 0
Ψ1(P ∗1 , P ∗2 , q1, q2) = 0
Ψ2(P ∗1 , P ∗2 , q1, q2) = 0
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For certifier 2 the second order condition for optimum equals,
∂2Π2
∂P 22
=
1
Ψ2q2
[P2
Ψ2q2q2
Ψ22q2
− 2] = 1Ψ2q2
[(1− q2)Ψ2q2
Ψ2q2q2
Ψ22q2
− 2] = 1Ψ2q2
[(1− q1)
Ψ2q2q2
Ψ2q2
− 2] < 0
(A10)
For certifier 1, the SOC is slightly more involved,
∂2Π1
∂P 21
=
∂q2
∂P1
− ∂q2
∂P1
− 1Ψ1q1
− 1Ψ2q2
+
∂q1
∂P1
P1
Ψ2q1q1
Ψ22q1
+
∂q2
∂P1
P1
Ψ1q2q2
Ψ21q2
. (A11)
= −2[ 1Ψ1q1
+
1
Ψ2q2
]− (1− q)(Ψ2q1 +Ψ1q2)
Ψ2q1q1
Ψ32q1
− (1− q)(Ψ2q1 +Ψ1q2)
Ψ1q2q2
Ψ31q2
In the numerical analysis, (A9) was used to compute equilibria, and the second order
conditions (A10) and (A11) were confirmed to hold.
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